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THE HUMAN LIFE
FEDERALISM
AMENDMENT-AN
ASSESSMENT
WILFRED R. CARON*
This Article presents a legal assessment of the Human Life Federal-
ism Amendment and considers the principal questions posed by others
dedicated to the protection of the unborn. In recognition of its precise
objective, the proposal shall be referred to as the "Life Amendment."
INTRODUCTION
The Life Amendment provides:
A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress
and the several States shall have the concurrent power to restrict and pro-
hibit abortions: Provided, That a law of a State which is more restrictive
than a law of Congress shall govern.'
It is at once evident that this new initiative to protect the unborn em-
ploys conceptually new means in pursuit of the traditional goal of the
pro-life movement. Although the amendment must be examined with
prudent circumspection, it is essential that the analytical process be one
of reasoned objectivity predicated upon certain fundamental guiding
principles.
* General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference. The author wishes to express his
deep appreciation to Angelo Aiosa, Assistant General Counsel, United States Catholic Con-
ference, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The language of the Human Life Federalism
Amendment recently has been revised and now provides:
A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution. The Congress and the several
States shall have concurrent power to restrict and prohibit abortion: Provided, That a
provision of a law of a state which is more restrictive than a conflicting provision of a
law of Congress shall govern.
S. REP. No. 465, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
27 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1982
GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE ANALYTICAL PROCESS
Norms for Interpretive Analysis
The language of the Life Amendment must be assessed by those
rules of interpretation which have been established by the judiciary for
its own governance and the guidance of the bar. However justified or
profound may be our disappointment with the results in cases like Roe v.
Wade," it cannot alter the need to rely upon those norms.
Statutory and constitutional provisions are a medium by which soci-
ety communicates its will to its members.' As with any form of language,
the potential for imprecision can affect the communication intended." It
is not possible to phrase a provision of law so perfectly that it cannot, by
a process of hypercritical "philological" analysis, be construed at variance
with what originally was intended. Cognizant of these limitations of lan-
guage, the courts traditionally have endeavored to interpret constitutional
provisions so as to effectuate, rather than defeat, their underlying pur-
poses.' The courts will look to the historical setting in which a constitu-
tional provision was adopted to reveal the purpose of its framers and
"search for admissible meanings of its words which, in the circumstances
of its application, will effectuate those purposes."' A corollary is this:
"The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room for con-
struction and no excuse for interpolation or addition."
Thus, in assessing the likely interpretation of the Life Amendment, it
should be borne in mind that a tribunal will not look merely to particular
words, but primarily to the manifest purpose of the amendment as evi-
denced by its historical context and the common understanding of what it
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 2A J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1-2 (4th ed. 1973).
4 Id.; see THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (New American Library ed. 1961).
B Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 374 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring).
See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457, 531-32 (1870); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842) ("[nlo
court of justice can be authorized so to construe any clause of the Constitution as to defeat
its obvious ends, when another construction, equally accordant with the words and sense
thereof, will enforce and protect them").
" United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941).
6 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931); see United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944) ("[ordinarily courts do not construe words
used in the Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they had
in the common parlance of the times in which the Constitution was written"); Lake County
v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 671 (1889) ("[tlhe simplest and most obvious interpretation of a
Constitution, if in itself sensible, is the most likely to be that meant by the people in its
adoption").
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is supposed to accomplish. It cannot be assumed that an antagonistic
court will subvert the intended effect of the Life Amendment through
arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation.
Objectivity and Resilience
Until now, proposals to protect the unborn have been substantially
locked in combat with the holding of Roe v. Wade that the unborn are
not "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Out-
raged, the pro-life movement has labored vigorously to reverse this unac-
ceptable concept and achieve explicit legal recognition of the unborn as
"persons." Hence, we come to a consideration of the Life Amendment
after more than 8 years of work with a different concept. It is critical that
preconceptions not impair objective consideration of the merits of this
innovative pro-life measure. It must be assessed in terms of its potential
for protecting the unborn. We must judge it by its necessary and probable
effects only; any other test would exalt form over substance and suggest a
lack of resilience which can obfuscate the truth.
Natural Law and Human Law
The assessment of the Life Amendment calls into consideration the
relationship of positive human law to the natural law or moral order. On
this profound level, the issue is jurisprudential and theological. It is natu-
ral for persons with a deep moral commitment to yearn for the conver-
gence of the moral order and laws promulgated by society. As St. Thomas
Aquinas taught, however, the proper office of human law is to serve the
common good of society; that function is not coextensive with that of
moral law.' In service to the common good, human positive law must take
into account all relevant factors, not only the moral ideal.10 This dynamic
is particularly complex in a democratic and pluralistic society. The appli-
cation of the relevant theological principles to the present situation
presents complex and profound questions, for which a well-grounded re-
sponse depends upon specialized theological knowledge. The bishops have
addressed this issue and provided leadership. My purpose is not to at-
tempt the requisite analysis, but solely to emphasize that a complete legal
analysis transcends a consideration of the legal effect of the Life
Amendment.
THE Roe v. Wade DECISION
An analysis of the Life Amendment requires an initial consideration
* XXVII THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA la-2ae, q.96, a.1.
10 Id. at a.3.
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of the relevant determinations in Roe v. Wade. The Court in Roe ob-
served that the constitutional right of privacy had been developing since
1891.11 In modern times the Court has progressively extended this right,
which it grounds in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty, to freedom of personal choice in matters relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing, and educa-
tion. This right of privacy, the Court held in Roe v. Wade, "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy."'"
Whether denominated a "right to abortion," or a "right of a woman
to terminate her pregnancy," this new "right""3 enunciated by the Court
was described as qualified, rather than absolute, thereby allowing some
state regulation. The Court held that in pursuance of its interests in safe-
guarding the health of a pregnant woman, maintaining medical standards,
and eventually protecting "potential life," the state may regulate the fac-
tors that govern the abortion decision but only at points and to the extent
that these interests become "sufficiently compelling."' "
In the Court's view, the state's interest in protecting the health of the
mother becomes "compelling" at approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, because before that point the incidence of mortality of pregnant
women caused by abortion may be less frequent than in normal child-
birth.15 Even at this point, however, the state's power to protect maternal
health extends only to regulation of the medical aspects of such proce-
dures (such as licensure and qualifications of persons performing abor-
tions, and requirements respecting facilities where it is performed). 16
Under Roe v. Wade, the state's interest in protecting the life of the
unborn does not become compelling until viability, that is, the point at
which the fetus is capable of living outside the womb. According to the
Court, viability normally occurs after the commencement of the third tri-
mester. At that point, the state may, if it chooses, restrict and prohibit
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to
preserve "the life or health" of the pregnant woman.1 7 Lest this power
appear overly significant, it must be stressed that in the companion case
II 410 U.S. at 152.
" Id. at 153.
Is The term "right," as used here, is not to be understood in the same sense in which that
term is used in denominating natural rights, those "which grow out of the nature of man
and depend on personality, as distinguished from such as are created by law and depend
upon civilized society." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (5th ed. 1979). Rather, it should be
understood in the positive law sense as the "power of free action." Id. at 1189.
14 410 U.S. at 153-54, 163-64.
,I Id. at 163.
Is Id.
17 Id.
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of Doe v. Bolton,18 the Court viewed the mother's health as encompassing
"all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, and the woman's
age-rele-vant to well-being."' If the Roe v. Wade right to abortion is
not de facto absolute, it falls only slightly short.3 0
The Court declined to predicate its qualification of the mother's right
to an abortion upon the personhood of the unborn within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment, or upon a separate theory that human life
commences before birth. Regarding the former, after reviewing the uses
of the word "person" in the Constitution, as well as observing that in the
19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they
were in 1973, the Court concluded that the word "person," as used in the
fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn.' Regarding the lat-
ter, the Court noted the wide divergence of medical, philosophical and
theological opinion, and denied the judiciary's cdmpetence to settle the
issue. Furthermore, it rejected the notion that "by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at
stake.,2
In terms of its practical effects, if not precisely in its rationale, Roe v.
Wade has enshrined abortion on demand as a constitutionally protected
right. It has privatized the matter of the life and death of the unborn and
almost altogether deprived society of its right to judge its welfare in this
fundamental aspect of life. The root of this result is the Court's holding
that a right to abortion is encompassed by the right of privacy. The
Court's rulings on the matter of the personhood of the unborn and the
commencement of human life served only to diminish the regulatory
power of the state. Had those rulings been otherwise, the life and welfare
of the mother would nevertheless have been pitted against that of the
unborn in a "due process" struggle, with the outcome an open question at
this time. There would have been placed in "due process" opposition, the
rights of one "person" against another "person," with an ensuing balance
of the interests that would inevitably require the choice of only one.
,S 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
old. at 192.
1o It has been observed: "That definition and the health exception effectively negated the
state's power to protect life in the womb after viability. There is not, I should suppose, a
single abortion performed that cannot claim justification in terms of the emotional and psy-
chological well-being of the person requesting the abortion." Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 5, 1981) (statement of
Prof. John T. Noonan, Jr.).
21 410 U.S. at 157.
I* Id. at 162.
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THE LIFE AMENDMENT
Roe v. Wade pressed the Constitution into the service of the termina-
tion of unborn human life. The Life Amendment will eliminate this func-
tion and place the Constitution in service to the lives of the unborn.
Upon its ratification, every state and the United States will be able to
deal effectively with abortion according to the will of the people, free of
the constraint of a constitutional "right" which places almost no value on
unborn life. It is truly a pro-life amendment.The Life Amendment is straightforward and powerful, yet possessed
of a simplicity which is essential to a proper constitutional statement.
The amendment has three components:
1. The absolute and unqualified denial of the Constitution as securing or
protecting any right to abortion;
2. The grant of concurrent plenary power to the Congress and the states to
restrict or altogether prohibit abortions; and
3. A proviso which seeks to give supremacy to the more restrictive law in
cases where both the Congress and a state exercise their power.
The analysis that follows is organized according to these components.
"A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution"
The above quote from the Life Amendment is representative of effec-
tive and necessary constitutional surgery. Because Roe v. Wade engrafted
a "right" to abortion onto the Constitution, it is essential to expunge that
right not only as it springs from the rationale of Roe v. Wade, but abso-
lutely. Importantly, this provision is not tied to due process clauses, or to
any other constitutional provision, in its abrogation of constitutional pro-
tection for a right of abortion. By virtue of this purposeful lack of speci-
ficity, it removes the possibility for grounding a right of abortion in any
provision of the Constitution.8 To say that this amendment would over-
turn the decision of Roe v. Wade, that there is a constitutionally pro-
tected right of abortion, is to identify only one aspect of its broad amelio-
rative thrust.
1. "Right to Abortion"
Some have suggested there is a flaw in the phrase "right to abortion"
upon the ground that Roe v. Wade spoke of a "right of privacy" which
" When he introduced the Life Amendment, Senator Orrin Hatch stated that "it should be
explicit that there is no constitutionally based right to abortion emanating from any provi-
sion of the Constitution that might potentially restrict the ability of Congress or the States
to legislate with respect to the subject." 127 CONG. REC. S10197 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1981)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).
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encompasses the decision whether to terminate pregnancy. The point is
not well taken. The phrase "right to abortion" is currently used and un-
derstood in constitutional law as referring to the right of privacy found in
Roe v. Wade. Indeed, one respected authority reports: "This same lan-
guage, or similar language (i.e., 'right to an abortion,' or 'right of abor-
tion') has been used in eighty-four federal court decisions since Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton were decided. The phrase 'right to abortion' is
used as shorthand for the constitutional right created in Roe and its prog-
e n y . . . .. , ,2 4
Clearly, the interpretive norms mentioned earlier would preclude any
misunderstanding of the meaning of "right to abortion." That the pur-
pose of this amendment is to overrule Roe v. Wade is so manifest that it
will be indisputable. Further, to employ Roe v. Wade terminology which
relates to "due process" would only narrow the reach of the provision
which, as noted, would exercise a claim of right from the entire Constitu-
tion. Finally, if there remained any doubt of the meaning of "right to
abortion," it would be conclusively dispelled by the grant of unqualified,
plenary authority to the Congress and the states to prohibit abortions.
That grant is entirely inconsistent with a residual constitutional right of
choice in the mother which would operate to restrain the exercise of that
authority.
2. "Abortion"
The term "abortion" must be considered from the standpoint of the
subject matter which it encompasses. What constitutes an abortion? The
term has been commonly used in state statutes restricting or prohibiting
abortions. Indeed, it is the term utilized in the Texas statute which the
Supreme Court dealt with in Roe v. Wade, where the Court used the
word "abortion" synonymously with the phrase "termination of preg-
nancy. ' '25 Modern medical practice regards the commencement of preg-
nancy as the time of the implantation of the fertilized egg in the uterine
wall.21 Clearly, abortion would include the intentional termination of un-
born life from at least the time of implantation. This was assumed in Roe
v. Wade.
Because of some early judicial precedents, it has been suggested that
the term "abortion" may be too readily subject to a narrow interpretation
which would partially defeat the Life Amendment's purposes. Careful
" Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Nov. 12, 1981) (statement of Prof. Lynn D. Wardle).
2 410 U.S. at 153-54; see J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE 150 (1979).
' See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC
TERMINOLOGY 299, 327 (1972) (definitions of conception and pregnancy respectively).
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analysis, however, reveals that such a concern is not well founded. Al-
though at early common law the term "abortion" was sometimes used to
refer to the expulsion 9f the fetus before quickening or viability,2 7 many
courts employed the term to refer to the intentional termination of preg-
nancy at any time between conception and normal birth.28 While both
usages were recognized by legal lexicographers even into fairly modern
times,3' with the advent of criminal abortion statutes in the United States
in the 19th century, this terminological distinction was effectively abol-
ished, first by the state legislatures and then by the courts. In effect,
when the term "abortion" was used it was done without regard to
whether the act took place before or after quickening.80 This modern, ex-
panded definition of the term "abortion" is reflected in the existing statu-
tory laws of the states. A sampling of such statutes shows that the term
"abortion," when it is used in the statutes, has come to apply to the ter-
mination of pregnancy at any stage, regardless of quickening or viabil-
ity.- 1 This expanded, current use of the term is, as already noted, re-
flected in Roe v. Wade.
If doubt remained, one only would have to consider the absurd result
if the term abortion were limited to the period before viability. There
would continue a Roe v. Wade right to abortion after viability but not
before, thus suggesting a policy which would reduce the protection of un-
born life as fetal development advances. This is contrary to common
sense, Roe v. Wade, and the policy of the pre-Roe v. Wade law which
imposed more severe criminal sanctions for the destruction of fetal life
" Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 59 (1851). The term "abortion" was sometimes refined even
further to refer to expulsion during the period between the sixth week after conception and
quickening of the fetus. Id. This terminology relates to the fact that at common law, in most
jurisdictions, the commission of an abortion was not a crime unless the fetus had quickened.
Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263, 265 (1845).
" See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 209-10 (1879); State v. Cooper, 22
N.J.L. 52, 54-58 (1849).
"See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 20 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968); 1 BouviEm's LAW DICTIONARY 88 (8th ed. 1914). But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
7 (5th ed. 1979) ("abortion" is defined simply as "the knowing destruction of the life of an
unborn child or the intentional expulsion or removal of an unborn child from the womb
other than for the principal purpose of producing a live birth or removing a dead fetus").
0 See State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333, 334 (1885); Hall v. People, 119 Colo. 141, 143, 201 P.2d
382, 383 (1948); State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, 606, 64 P. 1014, 1016 (1901); People v. Phelps,
61 Hun 115, 117, 15 N.Y.S. 440, 441 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1891); State v. Slagle, 83
N.C. 544, 545 (1880).
"I See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 (1978); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-1 [10-
107] (Burns 1979); MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3
(1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(2) (McKinney 1975); OHIO R v. CODE ANN. § 2919.11
(Page 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (West Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-301
(1975).
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after viability." To the interpretive norms mentioned earlier may be
added the principle that courts will void constructions which produce ab-
surd, unjust, or unreasonable results.8u
In the last analysis, the meaning of the term "abortion" (like every
other), as used in the Life Amendment, will be determined according to
its intended sense." For those who require even more certainty, the solu-
tion is definitive "legislative" history.
3. Personhood
Some have suggested that the Life Amendment involves a compro-
mise of principle because it does not explicitly identify the unborn as per-
sons. That is not the case. The Life Amendment will empower Congress
and the several states to provide the fullest possible protection to the
unborn. It contemplates the protection which attaches to personhood as
surely as if the term "person" was employed.
The Life Amendment declines to make rights dependent upon a cate-
gory or classification, and goes directly to protection. When rights depend
on the category of personhood, as they would in due process formulation,
the rights of all persons in the category may be adjusted according to a
judicial sense of human values, which could readily develop into sub-
classes of purposes of abortion. As noted earlier, recognition of the "per-
sonhood" of the unborn under the fourteenth amendment would have
meant only that the unborn, like the mother, would be protected against
deprivation of life without due process. The fourteenth amendment does
not protect life absolutely, as is readily demonstrated by the sanction of
the death penalty, but only assures that it will not be taken without that
process which the courts consider "due." Our experience with Roe v.
Wade and its progeny should lead us to other more reliable avenues of
protection for the unborn. The Life Amendment is such an avenue.
Not only does the Life Amendment empower Congress and the sev-
eral states to accord full protection to the unborn, but it calls into serious
question, and perhaps negates, the Roe v. Wade denial of personhood for
the unborn. This is not so much because of an interdependence of that
holding and the right of privacy holding, but because the Life Amend-
ment clearly and firmly negates the primacy of the mother in the conflict
of rights between mother and unborn child. Indeed, it resolves the con-
flict for constitutional purposes and fosters the primacy of the child in all
" See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
" United States v. Wainer, 49 F.2d 789, 791 (W.D. Pa. 1931); Schaeffer v. Thomson, 240 F.
Supp. 247, 252 (D. Wyo. 1964); see In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897) (statutory
provision construed).
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941).
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circumstances. If the Life Amendment is ratified, the manner in which
the Supreme Court would rule on the "personhood" of the unborn for
other purposes remains an open question. The Life Amendment provides
new recognition of the unborn, a major "personhood" development. It
seems wrong to fault the Life Amendment as compromising principle, and
it seems even more erroneous to suggest, as some have, that it ratifies Roe
v. Wade's denial of personhood to the unborn.
4. Ancillary Effects
It is difficult to assess the ancillary effects of the Life Amendment.
One respected pro-life leader points out, convincingly, that the abrogation
of the right to abortion will effectively nullify those cases whose holdings
were predicated upon a right to abortion."' By way of illustration, he re-
fers to the spousal and parental consent cases. 86 It appears logical to as-
sume that the excision of the right to abortion will seriously undermine
the holdings of such cases.
"The Congress and the several States shall have the concurrent power to
restrict and prohibit abortions"
In addition to denying all constitutional status to any right of abor-
tion, the Life Amendment would confer upon the federal government (in
addition to the states) a new power-"the concurrent power to restrict
and prohibit abortions."
Traditionally, and by virtue of our federal system, under which the
national government is one of limited delegated powers, the states have
been the guardians of the health, welfare, and safety of people. This re-
served power of the states, provided for in the tenth amendment, is re-
ferred to under the rubric of the police power. By conferring concurrent
power on the federal government, and by reestablishing the power of the
states, the Life Amendment would depart from this traditional division of
powers. However, precedents are not lacking. For example, the eighteenth
amendment gave Congress and the states concurrent power to enforce the
prohibition of the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating li-
quors for beverage purposes. Thus, on matters of important national pol-
icy, both levels of government may be called upon to effectuate such
goals.
The Life Amendment does not, by its own terms, prohibit or declare
restrictions on abortions. As a matter of national policy, it expunges any
" Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Nov. 16, 1981) (statement of Prof. Victor G. Rosenblum).
" Bellotti v. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 58 (1976).
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claim of constitutional right to abortion, and, subject to other constitu-
tional limitations (discussed below), grants Congress and the several
states complete discretionary power to restrict and prohibit abortions.
Each is empowered to formulate and enforce its policy according to the
will of the people whom the legislators represent. Such a grant necessarily
allows the possibility that abortion may not be prohibited in particular
circumstances. Yet, as a matter of national policy, the Life Amendment is
an unmistakable and decisive declaration for the protection of the
unborn.
As noted above, since the Life Amendment is directed against abor-
tion only, and against any claim of right thereto under the Constitution,
legislation thereunder will be subject to other constitutional guarantees
involving, for example, the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. Illustrative of the former is the application of
the so-called "due process" right of privacy to the use of contraceptives
by married couples. 7 Any earlier provision of the Constitution which
might conflict with the Life Amendment, and legislation thereunder,
would be deemed limited to the extent that the policy and provisions of
the Life Amendment would be controlling." No provision of the Consti-
tution could be invoked to dilute the plenary power granted by the Life
Amendment to prohibit abortions.
With power granted to both the federal and state governments, a
question immediately arises concerning the reconciliation of the exercise
of power by two sovereigns in a different manner. Although the question
requires consideration of the grant of the power itself, more particularly
the grant of "concurrent" power, it should be discussed in the context of
the final component of the amendment, namely, the proviso.
"Provided, that a law of a State which is more restrictive than a law of
Congress shall govern"
This proviso seeks to assure that when both the federal and state
governments exercise their "concurrent power," the federal law will gov-
ern except where the state law more stringently exercises the power to
"restrict and prohibit" abortions. By this device, the prospect of abortion
havens in particular states, which would inhere in a purely "state's
rights" approach, would be curtailed by the enactment of a preemptive,
minimum national standard. Although the objective of the proviso is un-
doubtedly sound, its actual legal effect must be examined in light of the
grant of "concurrent power."
87 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); State Bd. v. Young's Market Co., 299
U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
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The eighteenth amendment is the only provision in the Constitution
which expressly grants "concurrent power" to both the federal and state
governments. As a result, the legal effect judicially accorded to that grant
is relevant to an analysis of the probable legal effect of a like grant in the
Life Amendment. Section 1 of the eighteenth amendment prohibited the
manufacture, sale, transportation, import, or export of intoxicating li-
quors for beverage purposes. Section 2 provided: "The Congress and the
several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation."
Some of the early state and lower federal court cases applying the
eighteenth amendment held or suggested that if a federal and state law
were in conflict, the latter would have to yield to the federal law under
the federal supremacy clause in article VI of the Constitution." Others
were of the view that there could be no irreconcilable conflict between
two sovereigns attempting to enforce prohibition, albeit by different
means.4 0 The matter was settled by the United States Supreme Court in
favor of the latter view. Beginning with the National Prohibition Cases,4 1
the Supreme Court held that the grant of concurrent enforcement power
gave each sovereign equal and independent authority to enforce the na-
tional prohibition policy, and that, therefore, the statutes of both could
be enforced as the will of separate sovereigns.4' The federal government's
enforcement power is derived from the eighteenth amendment, while that
of the states is derived from the general powers reserved to them by the
tenth amendment.4'
As a result of these basic principles, criminal sanctions could be im-
posed by both sovereigns for the same transaction without violating the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy;" both federal and
state legislative schemes were enforceable despite significant differences.
Indeed, a state law prohibiting the possession of liquor specifically li-
censed by federal law was sustained.45 The only limitation upon both sov-
ereignties was that neither could validate acts or transactions which vio-
lated the prohibition of the eighteenth amendment; so long as their
statutes furthered its purposes, they were enforceable.
See, e.g., Ex parte Ramsey, 265 F. 950, 952-53 (S.D. Fla. 1920); State v. Ceriani, 96 Conn.
130, 133, 113 A. 316, 317 (1921); Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 236 Mass. 281, 292, 128 N.E.
273, 277 (1920).
,o See, e.g., Jones v. Hicks, 150 Ga. 657, 657-64, 104 S.E. 771, 771-74 (1920); State v.
Gauthier, 121 Me. 522, 525-26, 118 A. 380, 382 (1922).
-3 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
Id. at 387; see United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1922).
,s 260 U.S. at 381-82.
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 314 (1926).
• McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 144 (1932); see State v. Moore, 36 Idaho 565,
212 P. 349, 351 (1923), affd, 264 U.S. 569 (1924).
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It has been suggested that the grant of "concurrent power" in the
Life Amendment, without the proviso, would lead to the approach taken
by the courts under the eighteenth amendment. Since that approach was
tied to a particular substantive constitutional policy, and was developed
in the course of construing a concurrent grant of power to enforce that
policy, it is critical to examine and compare the nature of the grant in the
Life Amendment.
As earlier noted, the Life Amendment does not expressly prohibit
abortions or establish a lesser degree of restriction. Having substantively
nullified a right to abortion under the Constitution, it liberates the states
in the exercise of their reserved power under the tenth amendment to
restrict and prohibit abortions. Concurrently, it grants the federal govern-
ment coextensive authority. Each sovereign is vested with discretion re-
garding the manner in which it will exercise its authority. Thus, the par-
allel with the eighteenth amendment seems intact unless there is a vital
distinction between a grant of concurrent power to enforce an express,
absolute constitutional policy of prohibition (eighteenth amendment) and
a grant of concurrent discretionary power both to establish and enforce
basic policy (Life Amendment).
Although the Life Amendment does not contain an express prohibi-
tion of an activity, as did the eighteenth amendment, the evident thrust,
and circumstances of ratification, of the Life Amendment will clearly es-
tablish an unmistakable national policy of protection of unborn life. The
profound nature of that policy will be evident from the very fact'that this
nation will have expunged the decisional law which established a contrary
policy. It is possible, therefore, that the federal judiciary would give effect
to the laws of each sovereign to the fullest extent of their restrictive or
prohibitory provisions, based upon an analogy to the eighteenth amend-
ment cases. On the other hand, it also must be recognized that the con-
current power under the Life Amendment is as much a power to establish
substantive policy as it is a power to enforce. Although policy decisions
also were involved in the enforcement statutes under the eighteenth
amendment, they involved less substantive latitude. The potential for
conflict between the laws of two sovereigns under the Life Amendment
may be greater, thus rendering the analogy to the eighteenth amendment
less than precise.
It is the stated goal of the Life Amendment to effectuate the "more
restrictive" of the federal and state enactments. That is the purpose of
the proviso. It requires that when both sovereigns act, those legislative
provisions which most effectively accomplish the goal of protecting the
unborn will be given effect. Although the fundamental purpose of the
proviso is clear, its terms leave open some questions. For example, is a
statute more restrictive because it enumerates fewer categories of excep-
tions to its prohibition, or because, statistically, the exceptions would lead
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to fewer abortions, or because of both reasons, perhaps combined with
others? In determining which law shall "govern," will the entire statutory
scheme of each sovereign be compared and only one survive, or will there
be a selective judgment made concerning discrete, competing provisions?
The issue involves highly technical legal questions which are now
under critical discussion. That is by no means cause for hesitancy in sup-
porting the Life Amendment. The principle is there, and it will undoubt-
edly be effectuated to the extent that words and the lawyers' skill allow.
That is not to say that there will not eventually be a need for judicial
interpretation. The action of two sovereigns may lead initially to some
legal questions despite the tidiness of language or principle. However, this
is often a consequence of broad constitutional provisions and may be a
necessary aspect of adjusting to an amendment which recognizes a need
for national standards without preempting the freedom of the people in
each state to adopt more stringent standards to reflect their local values.
In the end, we also must trust the good will and judgment of the Congress
to enact legislation which will present the fewest problems in its relation-
ship to state laws.
CONCLUSION
The Life Amendment thus far has withstood expert legal comment
remarkably well. It has been critically examined by the attorneys who are
acknowledged leaders in the pro-life movement. Many have endorsed the
Life Amendment as a sound proposal.46 A few have not yet lent their
support, primarily because of their longstanding commitment to a meas-
ure which would expressly denominate the unborn as persons and imme-
diately provide for the prohibition of abortion. Their concerns, however,
are apparently more philosophical than legal. The Life Amendment is a
legally sound vehicle for attaining the maximum protection of the
unborn.
SUPPLEMENTAL DiscuSSION-A RESPONSE TO SOME CRITICISMS OF THE
HUMAN LIFE FEDERALISM AMENDMENT
The Life Amendment is practically assured of adoption in this Con-
gress if it is supported by all who are devoted to the protection of the
unborn. Those committed to abortion on demand correctly assess the Life
Amendment as the most serious threat to constitutionalized abortion
46 Supporters of the Life Amendment include, for example, Dennis J. Horan, Esq. (Chair-
man, Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund (Americans United)); Professor John
T. Noonan, Jr. (University of California, Berkeley); Professor Victor G. Rosenblum (North-
western University; Vice Chairman, Americans United); Professor Richard Stith (Valparaiso
University); Professor Lynn D. Wardle (Brigham Young University).
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since the Supreme Court accorded abortion constitutional recognition in
Roe v. Wade.47 Thus, the National Abortion Rights Action League
(NARAL) has launched an "Emergency Campaign to Stop the Hatch
Amendment" to assist it in meeting "this unprecedented threat to the
right to choose abortion." Yet, there are some in the pro-life movement
who counsel opposition to the Life Amendment in the belief that it will
not deliver as much protection for the unborn as other measures. Such
opposition, when combined with that of others, could defeat the Life
Amendment. If that is to be counted as a victory for the unborn, no one
has yet successfully explained why. As I shall show, no analysis has been
forthcoming which adequately demonstrates a legal basis for opposing the
Life Amendment.
The strictly legal concerns which have been put forward by several
pro-life attorneys are few and are readily answered. They are stated in
Opposing Memoranda"8 which reflect a common theme with occasional,
secondary embellishments. Before proceeding to legal analysis, however,
it is important to make several observations which will help to put these
memoranda in perspective.
Introductory Comments
In my principal statement, I anticipated the possibility that objectiv-
ity could fall prey to 8 years of single-minded commitment to protecting
the unborn through the overruling of Roe v. Wade's denial of their four-
teenth amendment personhood. I counseled:
It is at once evident that this new initiative to protect the unborn employs
conceptually new means in pursuit of the traditional goal of the pro-life
movement. Although the amendment must be examined with prudent cir-
cumspection, it is essential that the analytical process be one of reasoned
objectivity predicated upon certain fundamental guiding principles.
Among the principles I mentioned was adherence to established rules of
interpretation which teach the importance of context and the lawmaker's
intent. The Opposing Memoranda do not deny the validity of these prin-
ciples, but neither do they follow them.
The Opposing Memoranda indulge in hypercritical philological anal-
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
J. Baker, The Hatch Amendment-A Legal Analysis (1982) [hereinafter cited as Baker
Memo]; R. Byrn, Memorandum In Opposition to S.J. Res. 110 [hereinafter cited as Byrn
Memo]; Rice, The Hatch Amendment is not the Answer, Wanderer, November 26, 1981 at
6, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Rice Memo]; Rice, Supportive Memo on Hatch Amendment
Reveals Glaring Deficiencies in SJR 110, Wanderer, January 7, 1982, at 4, col. 5 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Rice Memo II]; J. Witherspoon, Constitutional Protection of Unborn Children:
An Examination of the "Hatch Amendment" (1982) [hereinafter cited as Witherspoon
Memo].
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ysis which has led to an erroneous portrayal of the Life Amendment. Re-
garding objectivity, it is difficult to consider the Opposing Memoranda as
genuine efforts intended to give the Life Amendment its due. This is evi-
dent not only from the hypercriticism already mentioned, but from other
characteristics as well. Thus, the Opposing Memoranda are essentially ad-
versarial in tone; they do not fully respond to the points made in my
principal statement; and one or more of them engages in such polemical
excesses as inflammatory language," distortions of my earlier discussion,
and affronts to-the bishops.50 These are not the hallmarks of reasoned
objectivity.
As for the theological underpinnings of the bishops' support of the
Life Amendment, the Opposing Memoranda appear to claim a greater
competence and a higher authority. Indeed, one lawyer assumed the role
of moral theologian and surprisingly opined that a return to the pre-Roe
v. Wade state's rights situation would be morally preferable to supporting
the Life Amendment. He then accused the bishops of "a betrayal of the
unborn child and of their sacred trust as moral leaders."' 1 Obviously, it is
the lawyer's job to present critical legal analysis. However, it overtaxes
the law degree to put it in service of claims to a philosophical and theo-
logical competence so impeccable as to justify such judgments.
The difficult question of whether to support the Life Amendment, or
indeed any measure to protect the unborn, involves not only legal ques-
tfons, but others even more profound. The point recently has been co-
gently expressed by Rev. John G. Johnson, Chief Judge of the Court of
the Diocese of Columbus, Ohio:
The abortion issue is a concatenation of several interlocking but dis-
tinct questions, each of which should be answered within the context of its
own field of study. Among others, there are questions of biology, questions
of philosophy, questions of morality, questions of jurisprudence and ques-
tions of public policy. Failing to distinguish these questions can re-
sult-must result-in muddled thinking. Failing to advert to the proper
data and methods for answering each question can only lead to irresponsible
conclusions."
A disciplined adherence to this truth is essential. The opinions of lawyers
41 See, e.g., Byrn Memo, supra note 48, at 4. Byrn charges the Life Amendment with treat-
ing the unborn as "rightless things" comparable to "snail darters" and "whales." Id. Simi-
larly, Witherspoon compares the treatment to that of "things," "chattels" and "slaves." See
Witherspoon Memo, supra note 48, at 4.
" See, e.g., Rice Memo, supra note 48, at 6. Rice accuses the bishops of supporting a mea-
sure (the Life Amendment) which legitimatizes "legalized abortion" and which "is at war
with the authentic teachings of the Catholic Church." Id.
" Rice Memo II, supra note 48, at 7.
*' Johnson, The Dynamics of the Abortion Debate, 146 AMERICA, 106, 106, (Feb. 1982).
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respecting matters other than law are entitled to no special weight.
Legal Discussion: A Right to Abortion is Not Secured by this
Constitution
Reduced to their essence, the Opposing Memoranda are predicated
upon these two major assertions:
1. The Life Amendment will not defeat the right to terminate pregnancy
established in Roe v. Wade under the mantle of the right to privacy, partic-
ularly in cases involving the health of the mother.
2. The Life Amendment affirmatively incorporates into the Constitution
Roe v. Wade's holding that the unborn are not "persons" within the mean-
ing of the fourteenth amendment.
From these erroneous premises, certain consequences are said to flow.
The phrase "right to abortion" is attacked as an ineffective phrase
because (a) Roe v. Wade does not literally employ it, (b) what is really at
issue is the woman's qualified "right of privacy" and the state's interest
in protecting fetal life, and (c) a woman's right to abortion may also be
grounded in her constitutional right to be protected in her health. Be-
cause I treated these points in my principal statement, I will hold this
discussion to bounds appropriate to a supplement.
The term "right to abortion" is judicially understood as referring to
the right to terminate pregnancy which Roe v. Wade found was encom-
passed in the fourteenth amendment right of privacy. To put the point to
rest, hopefully once and for all, I refer to the Supreme Court's own char-
acterization of the right it recognized in Roe v. Wade:
In Roe we held that Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1196, which permitted termina-
tion of pregnancy at any stage only to save the life of the expectant mother,
unconstitutionally restricted a woman's right to an abortion .... [Ojur
opinion recognized only her right to an abortion under those
circumstances.58
Objections to the efficacy of the phrase "right to abortion" are not only
niggling-they do not accept language already employed by the Court
whose interpretive authority over the Life Amendment will be final. This
disposes of specifications (a) and (b) above.
As for specification (c), it is sufficient response to insist that due ef-
fect be given to the entirety of the first sentence of the Life Amendment:
"A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution." The Life
Amendment does not merely expunge a right to abortion only as it may
arise on a particular theory, or claim its roots in a particular constitu-
tional provision. Rather, it denies any constitutional predicate or roots for
5 Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975).
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an asserted right to abortion. As I said in my principal statement:
Because Roe v. Wade engrafted a "right" to abortion onto the Constitution,
it is essential to expunge that right not only as it springs from the rationale
of Roe v. Wade, but absolutely. Importantly, this provision is not tied to
due process clauses, or to any other constitutional provision, in its abroga-
tion of constitutional protection for a right of abortion. By virtue of this
purposeful lack of specificity, it removes the possibility for grounding a
right of abortion in any provision of the Constitution. To say that this
amendment would overturn the decision of Roe v. Wade, that there is a
constitutionally protected right of abortion, is to identify only one aspect of
its broad ameliorative thrust.
The Opposing Memoranda do not confront this point. Rather, they ex-
plore constitutional possibilities as though the Life Amendment were not
as thoroughly purgative as it is.
The only reasonable interpretation to which the first sentence of the
Life Amendment is susceptible is the one stated above. That is so as a
matter not only of its precise language, but also as a matter of its histori-
cal antecedents and the Life Amendment's grant of plenary authority to
Congress and the states "to restrict and prohibit abortion." Plainly, a
woman is explicitly denied special constitutional prerogatives which can
be cited to defeat legislative enactments restricting or prohibiting abor-
tion. The suggestion that such legislation could be held unconstitutional
as an infringement upon her constitutionally protected "right to health""
is devoid of merit because it fails to recognize the broad sweep of the Life
Amendment. It also overlooks the fact that the right to abortion enunci-
ated in Roe v. Wade was grounded, at least in part, in the pregnant
woman's interest in her own health.55
1. "Nonpersonhood" of the Unborn
In the Life Amendment, neither the absolute purgation of the right
to abortion nor the conferral of legislative power to restrict and prohibit
abortion is a function of a particular status except that of being unborn.
The unborn are to be protected irrespective of the outcome of legalistic,
philosophical, or other debates over whether and when the unborn are
persons or human beings. In short, the Life Amendment gets down to
cases and avoids the debate which to date has frustrated effective legisla-
tion. Before addressing the particular criticism contained in the Opposing
Memoranda, it will be useful to comment on the exaggerated importance
which has been attributed to Roe v. Wade's holding that the unborn are
not persons under the fourteenth amendment.
" Byrn Memo, supra note 48, at 6-9.
" Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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As I observed in my principal statement, the fourteenth amendment
does not guarantee life, but rather that a person shall not be deprived of
life without due process of law. Capital punishment survives that test in
principle." In the unique situation of pregnancy, recognition of the per-
sonhood of both mother and child would perforce lead to a choice of one
over the other when abortion is at issue. Constitutional experience
teaches that the ensuing balancing of interests would provide no certain
security for the unborn despite the badge of personhood. Indeed, even
before Roe v. Wade's personhood holding, state enactments governing
abortion were not considered violative of the fourteenth amendment al-
though they permitted abortion in order to save the life of the mother as
well as for less vital reasons related to her well-being. It seems certain
that before Roe v. Wade, knowledgeable constitutional lawyers would
have conceded the shortcomings of "due process" personhood for the un-
born.5 7 Yet, because of some dicta in Roe v. Wade, the authors of the
Opposing Memoranda now perceive personhood as a secure haven.
In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun said that if the unborn were a
person under the fourteenth amendment, "the appellant's case, of course,
collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment.""8 This language has been substituted by some for constitu-
tional principle and analysis. It is held out as a guarantee that per-
sonhood and protection come hand in hand. They do not! In the context
of the case, the real significance of this robust but imprecise utterance is
very much in doubt. First, it is merely dictum5' and consequently does
not constitute precedent in the binding sense of stare decisis. 6" Second,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976).
57 See, e.g., UNIV. ABORTION AcT § 2, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1971) (superseded in 1973 by the Revised
Uniform Abortion Act, which was withdrawn in 1979). The Act, drafted and approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the
American Bar Association in 1972, is set forth in a footnote in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 146
n.40. The Act, as approved in 1971, allows abortion during the first 20 weeks of pregnancy in
cases of endangerment to the life or health of the mother, grave physical or mental defect of
the fetus, and rape (including illicit intercourse with a girl under 16 years of age) or incest.
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57, 157 n.54 (1973).
8" Statements in a court's opinion which go beyond the narrow question stated and decided
by the court, and which are not necessary to the court's decision, are regarded as "dicta."
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elecs. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 317
(C.D. Cal. 1968).
" Lower courts, federal and state, are bound to follow precedents of the United States Su-
preme Court. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Salerno v. American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). However,
it is well settled that neither the Supreme Court nor inferior courts are bound under the
principle of stare decisis to follow dicta from previous opinions of the Court. Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 568 (1933); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398
(1921); Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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its character as judicial rhetoric supplies no meaningful guidance as to
the choices the Court would make in resolving the due process issues
when the interests of mother, child, and state compete, especially consid-
ering the numerous combinations and permutations of those interests.
The prospects for the unborn would probably be nil in cases where the
mother's life (personhood) is at risk, with the degree of acceptable risk
now an entirely open question. The prospects are no more certain where
the health of the mother is involved, interpreted by the courts to include
"all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." 1 Although it may be as-
sumed that due process personhood for the unborn would diminish the
effect of the mother's "health" on her right to abortion, the extent of that
effect is also an open question. Third, to depend entirely upon due proc-
ess personhood for the protection of the unborn leaves them fully in jeop-
ardy where purely private (mother and physician) action is involved. 6 2 To
the extent abortions would not be prohibited by the state, they would be
unimpeded by the fourteenth amendment personhood of the unborn.
At this juncture, it is useful to compare the protection of the unborn
under the Life Amendment with that under their assumed fourteenth
amendment personhood without the Life Amendment. In either case, the
protection of the unborn depends upon the enactment of legislation. Sec-
ond, under the Life Amendment the legislative power to protect the un-
born is plenary and complete, unimpeded by a constitutionally protected
right to abortion. As noted above, mere fourteenth amendment per-
sonhood would not yield nearly so salutary or predictable a result. Third,
under the Life Amendment the power to protect the unborn extends both
to private as well as state action, whereas the uncertain protection pro-
vided by fourteenth amendment personhood falls far short.
The authors of the Opposing Memoranda are so immersed in years of
personhood disputation they do not see that the badge of personhood is
neither necessary nor fully efficacious in the protection of the unborn.
They castigate the Life Amendment for declining to make protection of
the unborn dependent upon the shifting sands of due process personhood.
More to the point, however, they wrongly accuse the Life Amendment of
endorsing the Roe v. Wade conclusion that the unborn are not persons
under the fourteenth amendment. Indeed, it is asserted that the Life
Amendment would formally incorporate that proposition into the
Constitution.
This criticism of the Life Amendment is unreasonable. Certainly the
language of the Life Amendment does not support the charge. As noted,
"1 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
" See generally Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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the Life Amendment does not explicitly ratify, nullify, or address the Roe
v. Wade personhood holding. Does it do so implicitly? Certainly not! In-
deed, as I observed in my principal statement:
Not only does the Life Amendment empower Congress and the several
states to accord full protection to the unborn, but it calls into serious ques-
tion, and perhaps negates, the Roe v. Wade denial of personhood for the
unborn. This is not so much because of an interdependence of that holding
and the right of privacy holding, but because the Life Amendment clearly
and firmly negates the primacy of the mother in the conflict of rights be-
tween mother and unborn child. Indeed, it resolves the conflict for constitu-
tional purposes and fosters the primacy of the child in all circumstances. If
the Life Amendment is ratified, the manner in which the Supreme Court
would rule on the "personhood" of the unborn for other purposes remains
an open question. The Life Amendment provides new recognition of the un-
born, a major "personhood" development. It seems wrong to fault the Life
Amendment as compromising principle, and it seems even more erroneous
to suggest, as some have, that it ratifies Roe v. Wade's denial of personhood
to the unborn.
I stand firmly on this statement, and the Opposing Memoranda have of-
fered no persuasive rebuttal.
The only discernible attempt to support the charge by analysis is
found in the contention that the unborn are treated as nonpersons be-
cause the Life Amendment leaves their protection to the legislative
branch. The fallacy of this view is self-evident in light of the vast reser-
voir of power vested in government which can declare lives forfeited when
the common good and public order require. My precise point is that we
do not cease to be persons because we are subject to law. The law recog-
nizes defenses to the crime of homicide, but it does not condone the
homicide. The law imposes the death penalty for serious crime, but does
not deny the personhood of the prisoner.
In short, it is fundamental error to assert that the Life Amendment
treats the unborn as "nonpersons," or "rightless things," or "snail-dart-
ers," or "whales" 8 because it entrusts their care to the legislative branch.
Such a view is not only conceptually unsound and logically indefensible,
but it literally ignores the Life Amendment's denial of constitutional sta-
tus to the right of abortion which has robbed the unborn of their rights
since Roe v. Wade. As already noted, if the Life Amendment has any
effect on the fourteenth amendment personhood of the unborn it will be
to support it. Finally, I have already demonstrated that due process per-
sonhood does not affirmatively protect the unborn, but only restricts state
action. By the logic of the Opposing Memoranda, under the due process
clause the unborn are also nonpersons because their protection is likewise
11 See note 49 supra.
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left to legislation.
Because it is clear that the Life Amendment does not explicitly or
implicitly adopt the Roe v. Wade personhood holding, the adverse conse-
quences envisioned by the Opposing Memoranda are moot. Thus, the Life
Amendment would not preclude the Supreme Court from reconsidering
its personhood holding in Roe v. Wade either through confrontation with
a personhood statute or by reason of other advocacy.
To conclude, the focus of the Opposing Memoranda is on the Consti-
tution. It must be recalled, however, that under the Life Amendment, Roe
v. Wade will not nullify the power of each state to declare the personhood
of the unborn either legislatively or constitutionally. Whatever may be
said of the status and utility of personhood for the unborn under the fed-
eral Constitution, it should be clear that personhood under state law
would be alive and well.
2. The Meaning of "Abortion"
In their resolve to fault the Life Amendment, the Opposing Memo-
randa also question the efficacy of the term "abortion" as applied to fetal
experimentation, and the destruction of unborn life before implantation
or in connection with in vitro fertilization. Without at all wishing to deny
the 'importance of this subject matter, it must be acknowledged that it
constitutes a relatively small segment of the abortion problem.
Before addressing these issues, I would refer to the treatment of the
term "abortion" in my principal statement, which has been distorted by
two of the Opposing Memoranda." Because medical practice may con-
sider that pregnancy commences with implantation, I noted in passing
that "abortion would include the intentional termination of unborn life
from at least the time of implantation." I observed, however, that the
legal usage of the term expanded after the early common law, and that
"many Courts employed the term to refer to the intentional termination
of pregnancy at any time between conception and normal birth." I ob-
served further that modern abortion statutes employ the term abortion in
this expanded sense, as did the Texas statute in Roe v. Wade, and con-
cluded the discussion with this statement: "In the last analysis, the mean-
ing of the term 'abortion' (like every other), as used in the Life Amend-
ment, will be determined according to its intended sense. For those who
require even more certainty, the solution is definitive "'legislative'
history."
The foregoing notwithstanding, John S. Baker has remarked: "Legal
counsel for the Catholic Bishops is apparently prepared to stipulate that
Baker Memo, supra note 48, at 13-14; Rice Memo II, supra note 48, at 4.
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pregnancy does not begin at conception." 6 With similar license, another
commentator charges that I consider it the "intent and effect of the
Hatch Amendment" to limit the restriction and prohibition of abortion to
"post-implantation termination of pregnancy."" Misleading remarks such
as these ignore or overlook the entirety of my discussion. They are espe-
cially regretted because they come from the academic community.
3. Fetal Experimentation
The Opposing Memoranda suggest that the Life Amendment would
not authorize legislation dealing with such matters as fetal experimenta-
tion and in vitro fertilization. The term "abortion" used in the Life
Amendment is broad enough to encompass legislation designed to protect
unborn human life in all circumstances and stages of development. The
Supreme Court itself used the term very broadly to refer to extraction of
the unborn at any time before normal childbirth.67 As already noted, the
accepted legal sense has expanded. For example, Black's Law Dictionary
defines "abortion" simply as "[t]he knowing destruction of the life of an
unborn child or the intentional expulsion or removal of an unborn child
from the womb other than for the principal purpose of producing a live
birth or removing a dead fetus."68 The expanded legal applications, to-
gether with the Amendment's broad ameliorative sweep, would seem to
assure that any destruction or removal of a fertilized ovum would come
within the reach of possible legislation where the intent is other than to
produce a live birth.
It must be kept in mind that the first sentence of the Life Amend-
ment would remove all constitutional protection from any purported right
to abortion. Once this is accomplished, legislation restricting or prohibit-
ing abortion would no longer be impinging upon a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Congress or any state could enact any legislation which is
rationally related to its constitutionally recognized interest in restricting
and prohibiting abortion. It is unlikely under this regimen that legislation
prohibiting removal of a fertilized ovum at any stage of development
could be invalidated.
By reasonable extension, the destruction of ova fertilized outside the
womb would be equally subject to legislative control. It would be absurd
to argue that because fertilization had taken place outside the womb the
matter had been placed beyond legislative power to protect human life.
65 Baker Memo, supra note 48, at 13.
Rice Memo II, supra note 48, at 4.
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973); J. NOONAN, supra note 25, at 150.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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Summary Remarks
There is no valid legal objection to the Life Amendment, at least
none that I have been able to find or that the Opposing Memoranda have
been able to support. What emerges is essentially a dispute concerning
what is morally required, based in part upon conflicting legal analyses.
Thus, the problem is that lawyers enter realms for which they have no
special professional competence, namely, the political, philosophical, and
theological. What emerges with equal clarity is that the Opposing Memo-
randa directly or indirectly advance the cause of other legislative initia-
tives. The Opposing Memoranda are not objective legal analyses of the
Life Amendment, my principal statement, or the supportive statements
given by many outstanding lawyers in the leadership of the pro-life
ranks.' 9
We are at a crossroads. Those who support the Life Amendment, in-
cluding the bishops, are fully committed to the protection of the unborn
and a solution to the problem and evil of abortion. They view the Life
Amendment as "an achievable solution to the present situation of abor-
tion on demand."1 0 They do not believe that in the present or foreseeable
climate of opinion an absolute constitutional prohibition of abortion is
achievable.
These are the true parameters of the dialogue between the critics of
the Life Amendment and its supporters. Purported legal criticisms of that
amendment which focus on the matter of personhood should be viewed as
nothing less than the expression of a differing point of view on a question
of policy grounded in moral considerations. It is not within the scope of
this paper to deal with the complex political, philosophical, and theologi-
cal assessments which underlie the decision of the bishops to endorse the
Life Amendment. Suffice it to say that those who attack the Life Amend-
ment on these grounds dispute the collective expertise, wisdom, and au-
thority of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in the United States and
the judgment of persons of good will who are associated .with other
religions.
I am left with a deep concern for those devoted to the protection of
the unborn, for whom the legal debate must surely be a source of
anguished disquiet. Nonlawyers cannot judge whether a legal argument
has validity in the law, although they can surely discern where logic and
common sense lie. The difficulty is that logic and law are not always syn-
onymous, law being an art which depends only partly on logic for its re-
o See note 46 supra.
70 Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1st
Sess. (Nov. 5, 1981) (statement of Archbishop John Roach), reprinted in 11 ORIGINS 357,
357-59 (Nov. 19, 1981).
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sults. In the end, we must encourage Catholics who are torn by the legal
debate to place their confidence where faith leads them. If they have faith
in the intelligence and moral commitment of the bishops, then they will
accept their judgment and leadership. If not, they will follow a different
leadership.
